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THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT APPROACH: REVIEWING 
POLICY STATEMENTS IN LIGHT OF APA FINALITY 
Emily Parsons* 
Abstract: Federal agencies engage in a wide range of non-binding action, issuing guidance 
documents such as policy statements and interpretive rules. Although these guidance 
documents may have a substantial impact on industries or members of the public, courts often 
refuse to review their substance. The Administrative Procedure Act requires agency action to 
be “final” before courts can review it. The D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have taken 
conflicting and often messy approaches in determining whether interpretive rules and policy 
statements are final and thus reviewable. This Comment proposes a new approach: the 
substantial impact approach. Under this approach—repurposed from a rejected test for 
procedural sufficiency of guidance documents—courts could review a guidance document that 
has a substantial impact on affected parties. This Comment analyzes the 2017 Department of 
Homeland Security memorandum rescinding Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 
highlighting it as an example of a subset of policy statements that should be reviewable under 
the proposed substantial impact approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In November of 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
issued a memorandum rescinding the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) program.1 In response, Dulce Garcia, a San Diego 
lawyer who entered the country undocumented at the age of four, sued the 
federal government.2 So did several other plaintiffs across the country.3 
As these claims continue to work their way through the federal court 
system,4 an important question will likely remain unanswered because it 
was waived:5 was the rescission of DACA “final” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)?6 This question matters because if 
rescission was non-final, Garcia’s challenge of the rescission was not 
reviewable in court in the first place. 
In 2012, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued 
a memorandum announcing DACA.7 This policy identified 
undocumented individuals who entered the United States as children as 
“low priority” for deportation when they met enumerated criteria, 
including a clean criminal record.8 Effectively, DACA allowed these 
                                                   
1. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, 
Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., et al. (Sept. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Duke Memo], 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/PPT3-
7G9F]; Carrie Johnson, Trump Rescinds DACA, Calls on Congress to Replace It, NPR (Sept. 6, 2017, 
4:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/06/548819221/trump-administration-rescinds-daca-calls-
on-congress-to-replace-it [https://perma.cc/E4KM-Q7X5]. 
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (June 28, 2019). 
3. NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 237 (D.D.C. 2018), adhered to on denial of 
reconsideration, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Duke, No. 16-cv-41196 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017); Regents, 908 F.3d at 514.  
4. See Status of Current DACA Litigation, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/8CDJ-4GEH]. The 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, preliminarily enjoining the 
rescission of DACA. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 
1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 139 S. 
Ct. 2779 (2019). 
5. See infra Part II (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s 2016 opinion holding that finality is not a 
jurisdictional element and can thus be waived); infra notes 319–320 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the DOJ failed to raise finality in any of its briefing at the trial court level).  
6. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).  
7. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Napolitano Memo], 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-
to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WUA-V2FH].  
8. Id. 
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young people to apply for deferred action in two-year increments.9 
Deferred action, a longstanding practice of prosecutorial discretion,10 
allows DHS to focus its attention and limited resources on removing 
undocumented individuals that pose a security risk by designating certain 
individuals as low priority for deportation.11 Individuals that receive 
deferred action are classified as “lawfully present” in the United States, 
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services will not initiate removal 
proceedings against those individuals.12 Lawfully present individuals 
may, in some instances, qualify for federal public benefits such as social 
security, welfare, and health insurance13 or state public benefits.14 
Moreover, these individuals can apply for work authorization.15 Lawful 
presence is not an enforceable right, however,16 and DHS may revoke it 
at any time.17 
In 2017, after a change in administration, the DHS Acting Secretary 
Elaine C. Duke issued a memorandum rescinding DACA.18 Duke relied 
to some extent on a letter from then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, which 
explained that the original DACA program had been unlawful.19 The 
decision triggered Garcia’s suit.20 
                                                   
9. Id. 
10. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, 
Director, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memo] 
(citing IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS § 103.l (a)(l)(ii) 
(1975)) (explaining that DHS’s practice of granting deferred action can be traced at least as far back 
as 1975). 
11. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting), as 
revised (Nov. 25, 2015). 
12. Id. at 148. 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a)–(c) (2012) (stating that section (a) exempts unqualified aliens from federal 
public benefits, (b) creates an exception for “lawfully present” individuals, and (c) defines federal 
public benefits). A lawfully present individual must still meet the independent qualifying criteria for 
public benefits. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 148. 
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)  (“A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the 
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit . . . only through the enactment of a State 
law . . . which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”).  
15. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2019). 
16. Texas, 809 F.3d at 188 (King, J., dissenting). 
17. Zuzana Cepla, Deferred Action Basics, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Apr. 15, 2016) 
https://immigrationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics/ [https://perma.cc/36WY-E8CY]. 
18. See supra note 1. 
19. Letter from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-letter-
DACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9RB-YH9C] (arguing, among other things, that the program lacked 
statutory  authority).  
20. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018), 
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DHS is a federal agency, and it issued both the DACA program and its 
subsequent rescission as policy statements.21 Policy statements—and their 
cousins, interpretive rules—are a useful but controversial agency tool. 
Agencies issue policy statements “to advise the public prospectively of 
the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary 
power.”22 Interpretive rules, on the other hand, “advise the public of the 
agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.”23 
Both policy statements and interpretive rules purport to be non-binding, 
thereby avoiding the cumbersome notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures required for binding agency action.24 
In practice, however, these rules can have real-world consequences on 
the lives and daily business activities of private individuals like Garcia, 
whether binding or not.25 DHS issued both DACA26 and its rescission27 
without undergoing notice-and-comment procedures. Regardless of real-
world consequences, the Ninth Circuit agreed that both DACA and its 
rescission constituted non-binding policy statements and acknowledged 
that a failure to observe these procedures was not improper.28 
In addition to avoiding the APA’s procedural requirements, policy 
statements have frequently been held as non-final agency action.29 The 
APA requires that agency action be final before it can be reviewed.30 Thus, 
if the DACA rescission does not constitute final agency action, a court 
cannot review the substance of the policy statement until final agency 
                                                   
cert. granted, __U.S.__, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (June 28, 2019). 
21. Id.  
22. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947), https://www.regulationwriters.com/downloads/AttorneyGeneralsM
anual.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ9L-3TET] (emphasis added).  
23. Id. 
24. Stephen Hylas, Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1644, 1651 (2017) (citing Jeff Bowen & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Partisan Politics and Executive 
Accountability: Argentina in Comparative Perspective, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 196 (2003)). 
25. See infra section I.A. 
26. Regents, 908 F.3d at 489. 
27. Id. at 491. 
28. See id. at 494–503 (discussing and distinguishing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)’s bar on judicial 
review of “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by law”). 
29. See infra Part III. 
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (“[P]reliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or 
ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”); id. § 551 
(defining “agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or 
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 
1326 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reviewing otherwise unreviewable presidential action once agency action 
implementing it became final).  
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action relying on it is brought.31 In other words, Garcia might have to wait 
until deportation proceedings were brought against her before a court 
would even hear the merits of her claim. 
To determine whether agency action is final, courts apply the Bennett 
v. Spear32 test. Final agency action (1) “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of 
the agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) is action by which “‘rights 
or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences 
will flow.’”33 Recently, the Supreme Court has reemphasized a pragmatic 
approach to finality, suggesting that the practical effects of agency action 
play a role in the finality analysis.34 However, the Supreme Court has 
never meaningfully reviewed the finality of a policy statement or 
interpretive rule.35 
 
Without precise guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts 
have taken conflicting and often messy approaches to reviewing policy 
statements and interpretive rules. The D.C. Circuit applies what this 
Comment refers to as the “categorical approach.”36 The categorical 
approach generally determines that both policy statements and 
interpretive rules are non-final because they are non-binding.37 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit applies the “flexible approach,” which 
sometimes holds interpretive rules to be final, but seemingly refuses to 
hold a true policy statement as final.38 In two notable 2019 opinions, both 
circuits appeared to shift their approaches.39 The D.C. Circuit shifted 
toward a flexible approach, holding that non-binding agency action is not 
categorically non-final.40 The Ninth Circuit expanded its flexible 
                                                   
31. See supra note 30.  
32. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
33. Id. at 177–78.  
34. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016). 
35. See infra notes 201–204 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court determined 
that a policy statement was final without any analysis and proceeded to dismiss it on other grounds). 
36. These terms were adapted from the terms “Rigid Approach” and “Pragmatic Approach,” as 
used by Steven J. Lindsay. See Steven J. Lindsay, Timing Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations 
in Chevron’s Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2452–53 (2018). Lindsay identified three main approaches 
the lower courts have taken to reviewing interpretive rules. Id. This Comment does not discuss the 
third approach because it is not relevant to policy statements, the main focus of this Comment. 
37. See infra section III.A. 
38. See infra section III.B.  
39. See generally Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019); Cal. Cmtys. Against 
Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
40. Cal. Cmtys., 934 F.3d at 631. 
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approach, holding that a policy statement was final.41 
This Comment argues that some policy statements, including the 
rescission of DACA, should be final and reviewable. It proposes that the 
substantial impact test—a test that was first used to determine whether 
interpretive rules and policy statements needed to undergo notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures and was later held invalid—is actually 
appropriate for determining whether guidance documents are final and 
thus reviewable in court. 
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I defines policy statements 
and interpretive rules. Part II explores finality as a bar to judicial review 
of agency action in courts. Part III explores the approaches that lower 
courts have taken to finality when reviewing interpretive rules and policy 
statements, particularly with respect to Bennett’s second prong. Part IV 
argues that some policy statements, including the DACA rescission, 
should be reviewable. It proposes that courts apply the substantial impact 
test in place of Bennett’s second prong to provide judicial review of policy 
statements that have a substantial impact outside of the agency. 
I. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS AS NON-BINDING            
AGENCY ACTION 
Federal agencies take credit for producing the vast majority of binding 
federal law.42 Yet agencies also engage in a wide range of non-binding 
action.43 The umbrella term “guidance document” refers to agency 
documents that detail non-binding action.44 These documents generally 
seek to explain an agency’s policies or to define and interpret binding 
regulations.45 Guidance documents are quite numerous, often 
                                                   
41. Gill, 913 F.3d at 1184–85 (citing Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 
(9th Cir. 2006)). 
42. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., MAPPING WASHINGTON’S 
LAWLESSNESS 2016: A PRELIMINARY INVENTORY OF “REGULATORY DARK MATTER” 3 (2015), 
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20-%20Mapping%20Washington%27s% 
20Lawlessness.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLF4-CBSN] (“Congress passes a few dozen public laws every 
year, but federal agencies issue several thousand . . . regulations.”). 
43. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-368, REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES: 
SELECTED DEPARTMENTS COULD STRENGTHEN INTERNAL CONTROL AND DISSEMINATION 
PRACTICES 1 (2015) [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE], 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669688.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWZ3-2587]. 
44. See, e.g., Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: Rethinking the 
Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 375 (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 43, at 1.  
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 1 (defining “guidance document” as 
“an agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory action, that 
sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or 
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outnumbering the binding regulations and statutes for which they seek to 
provide guidance.46 Because guidance documents avoid the rigorous 
notice-and-comment procedural requirements that courts have imposed 
for issuing binding rules, agencies may be tempted to impermissibly issue 
binding rules as guidance documents. Recognizing this, courts apply a 
variety of procedural sufficiency tests to determine whether a guidance 
document needed to undergo notice-and-comment 
rulemaking  procedures. 
A. Defining Guidance Documents 
As non-binding agency action, guidance documents are largely defined 
by what they are not: legislative rules. The APA exempts by name both 
policy statements and interpretive rules from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures required for issuing legislative rules.47 And this 
exemption is not insignificant. 
To enact legislative rules,48 the bare text of the APA requires only a 
“[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making,”49 an opportunity for written 
public comment,50 and “a concise general statement of . . . basis and 
purpose.”51 However, in the 1960s and 1970s, various judicial glosses 
were added to the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.52 
                                                   
regulatory issue”). 
46. Id. (“The number of guidance documents related to regulations issued by agencies has often 
been reported to outnumber the agency regulations that these documents can help explain.”). 
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012) (“[T]his subsection does not apply . . . to interpretative rules, [or] 
general statements of policy.”); McKee, supra note 44, at 375. The APA also exempts procedural 
rules, which are guidance documents, but are not the subject of this Comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
48. The APA requires notice-and-comment for “informal rulemaking.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). “Formal 
Rulemaking” is now rarely used. See Kent Barnett, How the Supreme Court Derailed Formal 
Rulemaking, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 1 (2017) (“In two railroad cases decided in the 
early 1970s, the Supreme Court allowed formal rulemaking to fall largely into desuetude with little 
fanfare.”). 
49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  
50. Id. § 553(c). 
51. Id. 
52. Compare the textual requirements of a proposed notice of rulemaking in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) 
(requiring a “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making . . . published in the Federal Register 
[including] reference to the legal authority [and] the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved”), with Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 
36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring agencies to “make [their] views known to the public in a concrete and 
focused form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives possible”) (emphasis added), and 
with Lisa Marshall Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743, 1755–56 (2019) (“These judicial glosses emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as the importance of 
rulemaking was surging, and they persist to this day.”). 
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Although these judicial glosses may have increased the quality of 
substantive judicial review,53 the resulting procedural requirements place 
a heavy burden on agencies.54 When issuing guidance documents, this 
non-legislative status affords agencies a valuable benefit. Rather than 
contend with the rigorous notice-and-comment requirements, “agencies 
often instead try to opt-out of the section 553 [notice-and-comment] 
process” by issuing guidance documents, such as interpretive rules and 
policy statements, in lieu of regulations.55 
One type of guidance documents are policy statements: “statements 
issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in 
which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”56 Policy 
statements “educat[e] . . . agency members in the agency’s work.”57 
Policy statements may be issued at all levels of the agency, by agency 
headquarters or field offices,58 under a variety of names—including 
memoranda, guidance, manuals, and staff instructions.59 
Interpretive rules, on the other hand, share many characteristics with 
policy statements—although some courts are careful to distinguish the 
two.60 Interpretive rules are “rules or statements issued by an agency to 
advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules 
which it administers.”61 Agency staff may issue interpretive rules at the 
request of regulated entities seeking to determine whether their proposed 
                                                   
53. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 387 (7th ed. 2007) (describing the D.C. 
Circuit’s “elaborate notice of proposed rulemaking” requirements as a procedural tool to allow more 
robust substantive review of agency decisions). 
54. Hylas, supra note 24, at 1648–49 (“[The notice-and-comment] process can be a time-
consuming headache that allows the public to both inundate the agency with comments and file 
potentially endless lawsuits arguing that the procedures are arbitrary and capricious.”); id. at 1651 
(“[O]ver the last several decades, [it] has changed significantly in ways that have created so many 
disadvantages to use of the process that many agencies avoid it whenever possible.” (quoting 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 64 (2d ed. 2012))). 
55. Id. at 1651. 
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 22 (emphasis added).  
57. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 145–46 (1962)).  
58. Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agency Policy 
Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 671 (1996). 
59. Id. 
60. See infra Part III. The D.C. Circuit has been inconsistent about whether policy statements and 
interpretive rules even warrant a separate analysis. Compare Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 
90, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (carefully distinguishing policy statements from interpretive rules), with 
Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(“Not much turns on the distinction between policy statements and interpretative rules.” (quoting 
EDWARDS, ELLIOT, & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 162 (2d ed. 2013))).  
61. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 22. 
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action would violate a regulation or statute.62 Agency heads may also 
issue interpretive rules as an agency-wide interpretation of a statute or 
regulation.63 
B. Procedural Sufficiency: Refining the Meaning of                
Guidance Documents 
Although policy statements and interpretive rules purport to be non-
binding, they “typically include detailed instructions for regulatory 
compliance”64 and can be highly coercive toward regulated parties.65 
Indeed, agencies may be tempted to issue new binding rules as policy 
statements or interpretive rules, a tactic referred to as agency 
gamesmanship.66 Litigants, in turn, may challenge a purported policy 
statement or interpretive rule as procedurally insufficient, arguing that the 
agency action is actually a legislative rule masquerading as non-binding 
guidance.67 Courts then employ a procedural sufficiency test to determine 
whether the rule is legislative. Failing such a test invalidates any 
legislative rule that did not undergo the requisite procedures. 
These procedural sufficiency tests seek to further clarify the line 
between binding and non-binding agency action. The resulting caselaw, 
however, has arguably “enshrouded” that distinction “in considerable 
smog.”68 As this Comment will further explore in Part III, these tests 
appear to be serving a second purpose in the lower courts: determining 
whether agency action is final. Wading through this “considerable smog” 
is thus dually necessary. This Comment will provide an overview of four 
identifiable procedural sufficiency tests: (1) the legal effects test; (2) the 
substantial impact test; (3) the impact on agencies test; and (4) the 
American  Mining69  test. 
                                                   
62. See Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1264–65, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (reviewing staff 
opinion letter that informed a company that its use of prerecorded messages that were triggered by a 
live agent were not “robocalls” under the regulation).  
63. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (reviewing as an interpretive rule a directive issued by the attorney 
general “proclaim[ing] that physician assisted suicide serves no ‘legitimate medical purpose’ under 21 
C.F.R. § 1306.04”). 
64. McKee, supra note 44, at 372.  
65. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2452–53 (2018); see, e.g., United States v. Acquest Transit LLC, 
No. 09-CV-00055S(F), 2018 WL 3861612, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (discussing an agency’s 
enforcement action “maintain[ing] [Defendant] failed to follow the Corps’ 2005 guidance”). 
66. Hylas, supra note 24, at 1651.  
67. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
68. E.g., id. at 947 (quoting Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
69. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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1. The Legal Effects Test 
One simple test to distinguish a legislative rule from a guidance 
document is the legal effects test.70 The legal effects test holds that a rule 
that “creates a binding norm”71 and “has the force of law”72 is a legislative 
rule.73 In effect, this test invalidates only rules that use binding language.74 
Of course, agencies may supplement non-binding language with a 
predictable pattern of implementation,75 coercion,76 and implication,77 
resulting in similar practical effects to binding substantive rules.78 In 
recognition of this concern, other tests have emerged to supplement the 
legal effects test. 
2. The Substantial Impact Test 
The substantial impact test seemed to solve the problem of agency 
gamesmanship in one swoop. This test looked to see if an interpretive rule 
or a policy statement had “a substantial impact on the rights and interests 
of the parties . . . .”79 If the court deemed there was a substantial impact, 
the rule was required to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures. 
                                                   
70. See LAWSON, supra note 53, at 420. 
71. See id. at 421; Jessica S. Schaffer, Air Transport Association of America v. Department of 
Transportation: Excess Baggage for Rules of Agency Procedure, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 313, 322 
(1993); see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(applying the substantial impact test). 
72. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
73. See supra note 71. 
74. Pac. Gas, 506 F.2d at 38. 
75. U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232,1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (identifying at most three incidents 
out of over 100 when the agency failed to conform to the penalty schedule it had outline in a purported 
policy statement).  
76. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 422–23; see also Leslie M. MacRae & Kenneth E. Nicely, Break 
the Rules and Run an Industry: Guidance Manuals More Destructive of the Rule of Law Than Bad 
Accounting, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7–8 (2003) (describing how regulated industries and the 
politics of the administration in charge may affect an agency’s regulatory behavior). 
77. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 422–23. 
78. Id. 
79. Kathleen Taylor, The Substantial Impact Test: Victim of the Fallout from Vermont Yankee?, 
53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 118, 138 n.157 (1984) (citing Action on Smoking & Health v. C.A.B., 699 
F.2d 1209, 1216 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (applying the substantial impact test to determine that agency’s rule was neither 
interpretive rule nor general statement of policy); Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481–
82 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the substantial impact test to determine that an agency’s rule was neither 
an interpretive rule, a policy statement, nor a procedural rule).  
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The court in Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor80 applied the substantial 
impact test to the revocation of a policy that prioritizing certain 
applications for permanent residency.81 The Secretary of Labor published 
a schedule that listed a number of occupational categories as being short 
in labor supply.82 Applicants with the listed occupations qualified for pre-
certification for permanent residency.83 They did not need to show a job 
offer or submit a statement of their qualifications along with the 
application.84 Without observing notice-and-comment procedures, the 
Secretary suspended the system.85 In holding that the revocation of the 
schedule needed to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, 
the court expressed that the schedule and its subsequent revocation had a 
substantial impact on employers and undocumented individuals.86 
Revoking the schedule made it more difficult for employers to fill job 
vacancies, and burdened individuals within the named occupations by 
requiring them to submit additional information before they could qualify 
for permanent residency.87 
The substantial impact test raised fundamental concerns, both practical 
and legal. The D.C. Circuit objected in particular to the use of the 
substantial impact test for interpretive rules. The test, it argued, had “no 
limiting principles”88 as “under the ‘substantial impact’ test every 
significant interpretative rule automatically becomes a legislative rule by 
virtue of its effect.”89 Furthermore, legal scholars and the lower courts 
inferred the holding of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.90—a 1978 Supreme Court case 
addressing notice-and-comment judicial glosses—as disqualifying the 
substantial impact test altogether.91 Vermont Yankee prevented courts 
                                                   
80. 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).  
81. Id. at 482. 
82. Id. at 480. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 482.  
87. Id. at 480.  
88. Taylor, supra note 79, at 126.  
89. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1094–95 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1978). 
90. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).  
91. See, e.g., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983) (“We agree 
that substantial impact does not make a rule legislative, but whether a rule has 
a substantial impact may be relevant in construing the intent of the agency in issuing the rule.”); 
Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 890–91 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Thus, in view of the express exemption 
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from adding judicial glosses to agencies’ procedures beyond those 
grounded in the APA,92 and the lower courts labeled the substantial impact 
test just such a judicial gloss:93 the words “substantial impact” do not 
appear in the text of the APA,94 and scholars argued that the test “ha[d] no 
plausible grounding in the . . . history of [section] 553 of the APA.”95 
3. The Impact on Agencies Test for Policy Statements 
Although courts no longer apply the substantial impact test,96 most 
courts apply some version of a newer test to distinguish between 
legislative rules and policy statements: the impact on agencies test.97 
Rather than focusing on the impact on private individuals or industries—
as the substantial impact test did—this test focuses on the impact on the 
agency itself. A rule that effectively binds the discretion of the agency is 
a legislative rule, even if it purports to be non-binding.98 More 
specifically, courts might infer from a pattern of enforcement99 or detailed 
internal guidelines100 that the ostensible policy statement is in fact a 
                                                   
in section 553 and the admonition of Vermont Yankee, we reject the substantial impact test and 
reverse the district court on this issue.”); LAWSON, supra note 53, at 423 (citing Cabais v. Egger, 690 
F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982)) (arguing that, under Cabais, “[i]nterpretative and substantive rules 
may both vitally affect private interests, thus, the substantial impact test has no utility in 
distinguishing between the two”); Taylor, supra note 79, at 127 (“The [Vermont Yankee] Court’s dicta 
declared that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and that courts should 
not mandate rulemaking procedures that Congress has not required except in extremely rare 
circumstances. Thus, where the enabling statute or the APA does not require notice and comment, 
courts may not mandate those procedures.”). 
92. Taylor, supra note 79, at 118 (describing how the Court in Vermont Yankee “emphatically 
declared that the judiciary could not engraft its own notions of proper procedure onto the APA”). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 126 (“There is nothing in the APA to warrant employment of the ‘substantial impact’ test 
to classify interpretative and legislative rules. The phrase ‘substantial impact’ does not appear in the 
APA.” (quoting Energy, 589 F.2d at 1094–95)). 
95. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 423. 
96. Id. For a thorough exploration of the effect of Vermont Yankee’s holding and dicta on lower 
courts’ application of the substantial impact test, see generally Taylor, supra note 79.  
97. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 423. Scholars also refer to the test as the “practically binding test.” 
E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, “Practically Binding”: General Policy Statements and Notice-and-Comment 
Rulemaking, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 496 (2016). 
98. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015); Prof’ls & Patients for Customized 
Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
99. Supra note 75.  
100. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 732 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (considering 
evidence of “hundreds of pages of DHS manuals and procedures that instruct, in painful detail, each 
step a reviewer should take and what types of evidence each reviewer may consider as evidence.”); 
U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 28 F.3d at 1247 (taking into account agency’s highly detailed penalty schedule in 
determining that the agency was bound to follow a guidance document). 
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legislative rule in disguise, even if it uses non-binding language. 
In the Ninth Circuit’s review of the memorandum rescinding DACA, it 
applied the impact on agencies test, determining that both the original 
DACA program and its rescission were a policy statement.101 Regarding 
the original program, the court pointed to DHS’s use of discretionary 
language and the fact that, although DACA applicants “self-select” (given 
that the application requires applicants to volunteer their immigration 
status and thereby risk exposing themselves to deportation),102 the agency 
still denied 17.8% of applicants.103 This denial rate was not insignificant 
and suggested that agency officials were not automatically applying the 
criteria.104 Instead, officials were using judgment and discretion in 
evaluating each applicant.105 The Ninth Circuit similarly characterized the 
rescission of DACA as a policy statement.106 While the memorandum 
requires agency officials to reject new applications for the DACA 
program, it also explicitly allows DHS to continue to grant deferred action 
on a case-by-case basis, leaving the background principles of 
prosecutorial discretion in place.107 
4. The American Mining Test for Interpretive Rules 
Courts often rely on a test laid out in cases such as American Mining to 
distinguish interpretive rules from legislative rules.108 The American 
Mining test focuses on whether the agency intended to have the force and 
effect of law.109 Specifically, a rule is merely interpretive when “in the 
absence of the [interpretation] there would [ ] be an adequate [regulatory] 
basis for enforcement action.”110 A rule that “repudiates or is 
irreconcilable with [a statute or regulation],” however, cannot be an 
interpretive rule because it amends rather than clarifies the law.111 
Some courts carefully distinguish policy statements from interpretive 
                                                   
101. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 507–08 (9th 
Cir.  2018). 
102. Id. at 507 (citing Texas, 809 F.3d at 210 (King, J., dissenting)). 
103. Id. at 507–08. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 513.  
107. Id.  
108. McKee, supra note 44, at 389. 
109. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
110. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997), abrogated 
by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015) (quoting Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1112). 
111. Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1113. 
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rules,112 reserving the impact on agencies test for policy statements113 and 
the American Mining test for interpretive rules.114 These courts reason that 
the impact on agencies test is not as effective at distinguishing interpretive 
rules from legislative rules.115 In fact, some Ninth Circuit decisions have 
expressed that interpretive rules may fail the impact on agencies test and 
yet still not be legislative rules.116 This occurs because some interpretative 
rules cabin agency discretion in future conduct.117 Agency-wide 
interpretations may require agency officials to rely on the interpretive rule 
in future action.118 Courts that accept this reasoning hold that interpretive 
rules nonetheless do not carry the force of law because they do not create 
new law; they merely interpret lawmaking that has already taken place.119 
However, not all courts embrace this stark distinction between policy 
statements and interpretive rules.120 Because interpretive rules and policy 
statements are both exempt from notice-and-comment procedures, courts 
are often “concerned only with distinguishing legislative rules from 
nonlegislative rules (that is, interpretive rules and policy statements).”121 
The D.C. Circuit has held that “[n]ot much turns on the distinction 
between policy statements and interpretative rules. The more important 
question is whether the disputed statement is merely informative or 
interpretative, or whether it is [legislative] and thus establishes a binding 
legal norm that is subject to judicial review.”122 
                                                   
112. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion vacated on 
reh’g en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
113. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts applying the 
impact on agencies test to policy statements). 
114. See Veneman, 469 F.3d at 840. 
115. See id. 
116. See id.; McKee, supra note 44, at 396–97. But see Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2468 (“Because 
interpretative rules cannot ‘command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything,’ they 
do not create ‘adverse effects of a strictly legal kind,’ and therefore ‘typically cannot result in 
justiciable disputes.’” (quoting Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 
F.3d 387, 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2013))). 
117. Veneman, 469 F.3d at 840. 
118. Id. 
119. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“An interpretative rule, on the 
other hand, typically reflects an agency’s construction of a statute that has been entrusted to the agency 
to administer. The legal norm is one that Congress has devised; the agency does not purport to modify 
that norm, in other words, to engage in lawmaking.”). 
120. McKee, supra note 44, at 389. 
121. Id. 
122. Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387, 393 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (quoting EDWARDS, ELLIOT, & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 162 (2d ed. 
2013)). But see Syncor Int’l Corp., 127 F.3d at 93–94 (“Further confusing the matter is the tendency 
of courts and litigants to lump interpretative rules and policy statements together in contrast to 
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Regardless of this theoretical dispute and the deceptively simple 
definitions of policy statements and interpretive rules, courts have 
struggled for decades to clarify the line between binding and non-binding 
agency action. 123 This distinction matters for litigants, like Garcia, 
wishing to challenge the procedural sufficiency of guidance documents 
that may substantially impact them. 
 
 
 
II. FINALITY AS A BAR TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF            
AGENCY ACTION 
Litigants challenging a policy statement or interpretive rule face 
another hurdle: the APA only permits review of “final agency action.”124 
Although agency action is presumptively reviewable,125 litigants 
challenging agency action must overcome a daunting number of obstacles 
before entering the courthouse. In addition to standing and ripeness under 
Article  III,126 a challenge to agency action must meet threshold 
requirements such as remedy exhaustion,127 issue exhaustion,128 
preclusion,129 and finality.130 Litigants must thus demonstrate that the rule 
is “final” or risk avoiding judicial review altogether.131 
A. The APA’s Requirement of Finality 
Finality is a congressional mandate, which means that Congress has 
placed the requirement on courts through the statutes that govern 
agencies.132 When an agency’s statute does not independently provide for 
                                                   
substantive rules, a tendency to which we have ourselves succumbed on occasion.”). 
123. E.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see supra section II.B. 
124. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
125. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 494 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“Thus, as a general matter, the Supreme Court has consistently articulated ‘a “strong presumption” 
favoring judicial review of administrative action.’” (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 575 
U.S. 480, 486 (2015))); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action . . . is entitled to judicial review.”). 
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
127. 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2010). 
128. Id. 
129. See generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). 
130. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
131. Id. 
132. 2 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1567 (6th ed. 
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judicial review, section 704 of the APA provides that “final agency action 
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to 
judicial review.”133 
In Norton v. South Utah Wilderness Alliance,134 the Supreme Court 
emphasized the important role that finality and other APA bars to judicial 
review serve in preventing judicial overreach: 
The principal purpose of [the APA] limitation[s] is to protect 
agencies from undue judicial interference with their lawful 
discretion and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy 
disagreements which courts lack the expertise and information to 
resolve . . . . The APA does not contemplate such pervasive 
federal-court oversight.135 
But finality arguably serves an “overlapping” function to other bars to 
judicial review.136 Indeed, it can be difficult to distinguish among finality, 
exhaustion, and ripeness,137 all of which control timing and serve the 
purpose of preventing “premature judicial involvement in the 
administrative decisionmaking process.”138 In one notable case,139 all 
three judges on a D.C. Circuit panel agreed that a challenged agency 
action was not reviewable, yet each rested their decision on a different 
                                                   
2019) (citing Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999)) (explaining 
that Congress appears to have the power to determine whether an agency action is final); see also 
Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Unlike reviewability doctrines 
developed by courts, final agency action is a statutory requirement set by Congress.”). 
133. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA provides default standards for judicial review of agency action, 
including finality. See McKee, supra note 44, at 389–90. In the past, courts sometimes applied a 
legislative/non-legislative test to determine if action under direct review clauses provided in agency 
statutes was a “regulation” or “final regulation.” See id. at 392. In Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 
543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the D.C. Circuit looked to whether the agency action had “binding effects” 
to see if it was a “regulation” under the direct review statute at issue. Today, however, courts tend to 
apply the same finality analysis for direct review statutes that they provide for APA finality. KOCH, 
supra note 127, § 12:20; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001) 
(holding that the term “final action” in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012), which 
governs the EPA, is synonymous with “final agency action” in the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704). 
134. 542 U.S. 55 (2004). 
135. Id. at 55. 
136. Manheim & Watts, supra note 52, at 1801; 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1453; 
Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Choa, 493 F.3d 155, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Exhaustion, ripeness, 
and the requirement of final agency action are related and often overlapping doctrines.”). 
137. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1453. 
138. Manheim & Watts, supra note 52, at 1801 (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 15.17, at 1105 (Aspen 4th ed. 2002)). 
139. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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timing doctrine.140 In an ironic turn, the D.C. Circuit recently stressed the 
importance of distinguishing the three doctrines.141 
If litigants cannot point to final agency action, the action is not 
reviewable142 for substance,143 though it may be reviewed for procedural 
sufficiency.144 Courts may still review the substance of non-final agency 
action in one of two ways. First, once an enforcement proceeding or other 
final agency action occurs, the substance of the non-final action becomes 
reviewable.145 Second, under some courts’ interpretations, litigants may 
waive the finality requirement by failing to raise it at the trial level. 
In particular, the D.C. Circuit argued in Trudeau v. FTC146 that APA 
finality can be waived because it is not a jurisdictional element.147 
Resolving a jurisdictional element determines whether a court even has 
the power to hear a case, meaning that the issue cannot be waived.148 In 
Trudeau, the D.C. Circuit relied on Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,149 in which 
the Supreme Court held that the Court will not interpret a threshold 
determination as jurisdictional unless Congress “clearly states that a 
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional.”150 
Because the APA does not clearly indicate that finality is jurisdictional, 
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the issue can be waived.151 Under this 
                                                   
140. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1454. 
141. Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[W]hile courts often 
mingle the three doctrines [of finality, ripeness, and exhaustion], they are analytically distinct.”). 
142. McKee, supra note 44, at 397; see, e.g., Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 
631 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the Wehrum Memo is not final 
agency action, and we dismiss the petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Act. We 
express no opinion as to whether the Wehrum Memo is prudentially ripe, an interpretive rule or a 
legislative rule, or on the merits of its interpretation.”). 
143. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
144. See supra section I.B (describing procedural sufficiency tests for purported policy statements 
and interpretive rules). 
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“[P]reliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or 
ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551 (defining “agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, 
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 
1322, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reviewing otherwise unreviewable presidential action once agency 
action implementing it became final). 
146. 456 F.3d 178 (2006). 
147. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 184 (2006). For a detailed overview of the reasoning 
underlying this decision and its impact, see generally Sundeep Iyer, Jurisdictional Rules and Final 
Agency Action, 125 YALE L.J. 785, 790 (2016). 
148. Iyer, supra note 147, at 787. 
149. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
150. Id. at 515–16. 
151. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 184 n.7. 
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interpretation, if the agency fails to dispute the finality of the challenged 
action at the trial level, appellate courts will not be able to later revisit the 
issue.152 As of 2014, several circuits that had originally applied finality as 
a jurisdictional element—including, at least, the Second Circuit, the 
Fourth Circuit, and the Federal Circuit—have found the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning persuasive and subsequently questioned whether finality is 
indeed jurisdictional.153 
B. The Supreme Court Defines Final Agency Action 
In 1997, the Supreme Court synthesized its finality analysis into the 
Bennett test: a two-part test that focused on legal consequences.154 In 
several cases before Bennett v. Spear, 155 and in one subsequent 2016 case 
Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.,156 however, the Supreme Court 
emphasized a “‘pragmatic’ approach” to finality, which looked to 
practical effects as well.157 Notably, although Hawkes cited to Bennett as 
the official rule for finality, the decision in Hawkes could extend Bennett’s 
finality doctrine to consider not only legal consequences but also practical 
consequences. 
1. The Bennett Test 
In Bennett, the Supreme Court laid out the prevailing test to determine 
whether agency action is indeed “final” under section 704.158 Under the 
two-part test in Bennett, final agency action (1) “mark[s] the 
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) is 
action by which “‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from 
which ‘legal consequences will flow.’”159 
In Bennett, litigants challenged an opinion letter issued by the Fish & 
Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).160 The ESA 
requires the Secretary to identify “threatened” and “endangered” species 
and their designated habitat, at which point other agencies must determine 
                                                   
152. Iyer, supra note 147, at 787. 
153. Id. at 790. 
154. McKee, supra note 44, at 374. 
155. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
156. 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). 
157. Id. at 1815. 
158. McKee, supra note 44, at 374. 
159. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78. 
160. Id. at 179. 
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whether proposed action may affect that species or its habitat.161 If an 
agency determines that its proposed action may affect that species, the 
agency must meet with the Fish and Wildlife Service, which will issue an 
opinion letter.162 That Biological Opinion determines whether the action 
might jeopardize the species and what, if any, alternative actions the 
agency should take.163 Any such actions are put in an Incidental Take 
Statement, which lays out the “terms and conditions . . . that must be 
complied with by the Federal agency . . . .”164 
Although the government argued that the Biological Opinion did not 
constitute “final agency action” because it was merely advisory and 
created no legal obligation,165 the Court unanimously held that the opinion 
letter was final.166 The Court pointed specifically to the binding language 
in the Incidental Take Statement determining that the action met the 
second prong of the finality test.167 As the Court explained, the agency 
was, “to put it mildly, keenly aware of the virtually determinative effect 
of its biological opinions.”168 Indeed, the Biological Opinion “alter[ed] 
the legal regime to which the action agency is subject . . . .”169 The 
Biological Opinion may not have been binding itself, but it would 
inevitably trigger an Incidental Take Statement, which contained binding 
language on its face. 
2. The Supreme Court’s Pragmatic Approach in Abbott Laboratories 
and Hawkes 
For thirty years prior to Bennett, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner170 
served as the leading case on finality.171 As part of its analysis of ripeness, 
the Court in Abbott Laboratories held that a drug labeling regulation was 
                                                   
161. Id. at 157–58. The opinion letter in Bennett does not qualify under the APA as either a 
regulation, a policy statement, or an interpretive rule. Instead, it has its own procedural requirements 
as outlined by statute. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2012). Bennett thus does not directly address how the 
Supreme Court would approach finality in the context of a policy statement. 
162. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 157–58. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 158 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)) (emphasis added).  
165. Id. at 177 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)).  
166. Id. at 179. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 170. 
169. Id. at 178. 
170. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
171. 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2010). 
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final, although the agency had not brought enforcement proceedings.172 
The Court in Abbott Laboratories applied what would later be referred 
to as Bennett’s first prong. The regulation at issue “mark[ed] the 
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process.”173 As the Court 
explained, “[t]here [was] no hint that this regulation [was] informal . . . or 
only the ruling of a subordinate official, . . . or tentative.”174 
However, rather than referencing “rights or obligations” or “legal 
consequences,” as the Court later did in announcing the second prong in 
Bennett, 175 the Court in Abbott Laboratories emphasized the “direct and 
immediate” impact that the regulation would have on the plaintiffs.176 The 
Court explained that the regulation “ha[d] a direct effect on the day-to-
day business” of regulated parties and put them “in a dilemma.”177 
Plaintiffs, the Court explained, must either “comply . . . and incur the 
costs . . . or they must follow their present course and risk prosecution.”178 
The Court in Abbott Laboratories relied on several previous cases to 
emphasize the “pragmatic” and “flexible” approach that it had generally 
taken to finality.179 For example, an agency’s mere statement of its 
intentions may constitute final agency action when “expected conformity 
to [the agency’s intentions] causes injury cognizable by a court of 
equity . . . .”180 Furthermore, agency action may be final even when the 
action carries “no authority” except in giving notice of how to 
interpret  a  statute.181 
In 2016—nearly twenty years after the Supreme Court laid out 
Bennett’s two-pronged test—U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes 
Co.182 seemed to revive the pragmatic approach described in Abbott 
Laboratories,183 significantly relaxing the standard for final agency 
                                                   
172. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 138. 
173. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).  
174. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 151.  
175. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)). 
176. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152. 
177. Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855, 861 (D. Del.1964)). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 149–50 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Frozen 
Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956)). 
180. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 150.  
181. Id. (citing Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. at 45). 
182. __U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).  
183. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016) 
(explaining that the Court’s decision tracks the pragmatic approach applied in cases such as 
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action.184 In Hawkes, the Court held that a jurisdictional determination that 
an area contained “waters of the United States” by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers was final agency action because it resulted in “direct and 
appreciable legal consequences.”185 A “negative” jurisdictional 
determination that the area did not contain “waters of the United States” 
would have given the party “a five-year safe harbor from [government] 
civil enforcement proceedings.”186 Therefore, a “positive” determination 
that the area did contain “waters of the United States” also brought legal 
consequences: the missed opportunity of a five-year safe harbor.187 
Plaintiffs could simply have acted in contravention of the determination188 
and faced an enforcement proceeding,189 which would have 
incontrovertibly constituted final agency action.190 But, as the Court 
explained, it would unfairly put the plaintiffs at risk for a large penalty if 
a court ultimately sided with the agency.191 This final consideration 
echoed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Abbott Laboratories, where the 
Court described the “dilemma” of plaintiffs who must either 
“comply . . . and incur the costs . . . or . . . follow their present course and 
risk prosecution.”192 
As part of its analysis, the majority pointed out that its conclusion 
“tracks the ‘pragmatic’ approach we have long taken to finality.”193 The 
Court cited Abbott Laboratories and another case, Frozen Food Express 
v. United States,194 in support of their longstanding pragmatic approach.195 
The Hawkes Court emphasized a particular similarity between Frozen 
Food and Hawkes: the threat of criminal penalties.196 In both cases, the 
Court explained, “no administrative or criminal proceeding c[ould] be 
                                                   
Abbott  Laboratories). 
184. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1454. 
185. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1810 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (2016)). 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 1812. 
188. Id. at 1814.  
189. Id.  
190. Id. at 1815.  
191. Id.  
192. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).  
193. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).  
194. 351 U.S. 40 (1956). 
195. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815 (citing Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 
76  (1956)). 
196. Id.   
 
19 Parsons.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  7:23 PM 
516 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:495 
 
brought for failure to conform to the [challenged agency action] itself.”197 
However, the challenged agency action “warn[ed]” of “the risk of 
significant criminal and civil penalties.”198 The decision in Hawkes 
functionally revived the Abbott Laboratories pragmatic approach, 
possibly extending the finality doctrine into practical consequences rather 
than merely legal consequences,199 as had been laid out in Bennett.200 
III. REVIEWING POLICY STATEMENTS AND INTERPRETIVE 
RULES IN LIGHT OF FINALITY 
The Supreme Court has not yet unambiguously held that an interpretive 
rule or policy statement was final. The Court came close to speaking 
directly on the issue in National Park Hospitality Association v. DOI.201 
That case involved a regulation that had undergone notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.202 Because the agency sought to interpret a statute that it did 
not administer and had no power to enforce, the Court held that it was a 
general statement of policy—rather than a regulation—under section 553 
of the APA.203 In half a sentence devoid of any analysis, the Court 
indicated that the regulation was final agency action, but then proceeded 
to hold that the regulation was not ripe for review.204 
In the absence of robust analysis from the Supreme Court, lower courts 
have been divided on the meaning of Bennett’s second prong. The D.C. 
Circuit generally applies a categorical approach to finality.205 That 
approach virtually always holds that both interpretive rules and policy 
statements are not final. The Ninth Circuit embraces a flexible approach—
drawing from cases like Abbott Laboratories and Hawkes.206 Courts in the 
Ninth Circuit are more likely to hold that an interpretive rule is final 
agency action under the Bennett test,207 but the finality of policy 
statements was less clear until recently. Two cases decided in 2019 
                                                   
197. Id. 
198. Id.  
199. 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2010). 
200. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). 
201. 538 U.S. 803 (2003).  
202. Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S. 803, 806 (2003). 
203. Id. at 809.  
204. Id. at 812. The dissent agreed that the agency action was final, explaining that it was “not 
tentative or likely to change.” Id. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
205. See infra section III.A. 
206. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2466–67.  
207. See infra section III.B. 
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indicate that both circuits may be shifting toward a more flexible approach 
to Bennett’s second prong.208 
A. The D.C. Circuit’s Categorical Approach 
The D.C. Circuit’s categorical approach appears to “categorically 
preclude from pre-enforcement review all interpretative rules and policy 
statements.”209 In other words, under the categorical approach, if the 
guidance document at issue is a guidance document, it is not final. In 
effect, the categorical approach has repurposed the procedural sufficiency 
tests introduced in Part I, section B of this Comment. 
When reviewing a policy statement, the D.C. Circuit appears to apply 
the impact on agencies test—the test used for the procedural sufficiency 
of policy statements210—in place of Bennett’s second prong.211 In 
National Association of Home Builders v. Norton,212 the D.C. Circuit held 
that a policy statement was not final because “there is insufficient 
evidence in the record to conclude that either of the Protocols binds the 
agency sufficiently to make it a substantive rule under the reasoning of [a 
D.C. Circuit case applying the impact on agencies test].”213 
Norton emphasized the binding effect of the challenged rule on the 
agency’s discretion, which is also a key factor in the impact on agencies 
test described in section II.B.3.214 When applying the impact on agencies 
test, courts typically look at enforcement actions to see if they conform to 
a purported policy statement.215 The Norton Court explained that “there 
ha[d] been no enforcement actions that indicate[d] whether the FWS 
                                                   
208. See generally Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Gill v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.  2019). 
209. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2466.  
210. See supra section I.B. 
211. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).  
212. 415 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
213. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). In place of the impact on agencies test, the Norton court referenced 
Community Nutrition, a case that applied the impact on agencies test. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. 
Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“We conclude that in the circumstances of this case, 
FDA by virtue of its own course of conduct has chosen to limit its discretion and promulgated action 
levels which it gives a present, binding effect.”). 
214. See, e.g., U.S. Telephone Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a federal 
agency may not issue a policy that binds agency officials’ discretion without first following the notice 
and comment procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act); Professionals and Patients 
for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e follow the D.C. Circuit’s 
analysis in determining whether [the rule] is a substantive rule under the APA, focusing primarily on 
whether the rule has binding effect on agency discretion or severely restricts it.”). 
215. See, e.g., U.S. Telephone Ass’n, 28 F.3d 1232; Shalala, 56 F.3d 592. 
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consider[ed] itself bound by survey results.”216 Similarly, in a more recent 
case, Sierra Club v. EPA,217 the D.C. Circuit applied the equivalent of the 
impact on agencies test to hold that a policy statement was “not binding 
on the agency or affected parties and therefore d[id] not constitute ‘final 
action.’218 The arguments of both courts boiled down to this: the policy 
statement was a policy statement, so it was not final. 
Under the categorical approach, interpretive rules receive similar 
treatment. In American Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration,219 the D.C. Circuit held that a labeling requirement 
was not final precisely because it was an interpretive rule.220 The court 
reasoned that “[b]ecause Paragraph  (a)(2) is merely interpretative, it is 
not subject to notice and comment rulemaking under the APA, and it is 
not subject to judicial review . . . .”221 Applying the procedural sufficiency 
test thus served a dual function: determining simultaneously that the 
labeling requirement was an interpretive rule and that it was non-final.222 
In Association of Flight Attendants v. Huerta,223 the D.C. Circuit 
further entrenched the idea that a guidance document cannot be final.224 
The court held that a guidance document was non-final without even 
determining whether it was a policy statement or an interpretive rule.225 
As the court explained, “[i]t really does not matter whether [the guidance 
document] is viewed as a policy statement.”226 What mattered, was that 
the guidance document was “not a legislative rule carrying the ‘force and 
effect of law.’”227 Because it was a guidance document, it was not  final.228 
In a 2019 case, California Communities Against Toxics v. EPA, 229 the 
D.C. Circuit took a sharp turn in the opposite direction.230 The D.C. 
                                                   
216. Norton, 415 F.3d at 17.  
217. 873 F.3d 946 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
218. Id. at 948. 
219. 738 F.3d 387 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
220. Id. at 390.  
221. Id.  
222. Id. 
223. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
224. Id. at 716. 
225. Id. 
226. Id.  
227. Id. (quoting Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015)). 
228. Id. at 713 (“The Notice is nothing more than an internal guidance document . . . . Therefore, 
the Notice does not reflect final agency action.”). 
229. 934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
230. Id. at 627, 631. 
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Circuit reviewed a memo issued by an administrator within the EPA 
interpreting a section of the Clean Air Act.231 The court cautioned against 
the reasoning in a line of cases that improperly combined “the related but 
separate analysis of whether an agency action is a legislative rule.”232 
According to the court, these cases, including Huerta, failed to recognize 
recent Supreme Court precedent indicating that “the finality analysis is 
distinct from the test for whether an agency action is a legislative rule.”233 
In other words, the approach to finality should not be quite so categorical. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Flexible Approach 
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit’s precedent, the Ninth Circuit recognizes 
a stark difference between interpretive rules and policy statements. 
Although interpretive rules do not carry the force and effect of law, they 
may, in some cases, bind the agency’s discretion.234 Such interpretive 
rules have legal consequences under the Bennett test and are considered 
final.235 Policy statements, under the impact on agencies test, cannot bind 
the agency’s discretion and thus cannot be final. Effectively, the Ninth 
Circuit’s flexible approach applies the impact on agency test in place of 
Bennett’s second prong. Thus, the Ninth Circuit differs from the D.C. 
Circuit by allowing review of interpretive rules. However, this approach 
appeared to preclude all policy statements from judicial review until a 
2019 case, Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,236 in which the Ninth Circuit held 
that a policy statement was final.237 
Under the flexible approach, some interpretive rules can be final 
agency action. Although interpretive rules do not independently carry “the 
force of law[,]” they may have legal consequences on the agency.238 For 
example, in Oregon v. Ashcroft,239 the Attorney General had issued an 
interpretive rule that declared that physician assisted suicide violated the 
                                                   
231. Id.  
232. Id. at 634.  
233. Id. 
234. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion vacated on 
reh’g en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
235. Id. 
236. 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019). 
237. Id. at 1184–85 (citing Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th 
Cir.  2006)). 
238. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1148 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
239.Id. 
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Controlled Substances Act.240 The rule constituted final agency action 
because the “instruction created direct and immediate consequences for 
physicians who wish to prescribe controlled substances for assisted 
suicide.”241 The directive “significantly and immediately alter[ed] the 
legal landscape for Oregon physicians.”242 The dissenting opinion agreed 
that that the rule was final “even though it [wa]s a nonbinding, pre-
enforcement, interpretive rule.”243 
The Ninth Circuit’s willingness to hold policy statements as final, 
however, remained unclear for some time. Two opinions announced in 
2006—Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman,244 and Oregon Natural 
Desert Association v. U.S. Forest Service245—indicated conflicting views 
on whether a true policy statement could ever be final agency action 
under  Bennett. 
In Veneman, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that a true policy 
statement could not constitute final agency action. In that case, the court 
reviewed a disputed “Draft Policy” that was not yet issued.246 The issue 
of finality hinged on whether the draft policy was an interpretive rule or a 
policy statement.247 The court was careful to characterize the “Draft 
Policy” as an interpretive rule rather than a policy statement.248 As an 
interpretive rule, the “Draft Policy” would have been final because the 
agency “would have bound itself to a particular interpretation of [the 
statute] for enforcement purposes had it adopted the Draft Policy.”249 
The court’s reasoning suggested that, like the D.C. Circuit, the 
Veneman court had effectively supplanted Bennett’s second prong with 
the impact on agency test. The court explained that a “‘typical policy 
statement’ is ‘not reviewable at all.’”250 Unlike policy statements, which 
by definition do not bind the agency’s discretion,251 interpretive rules, may 
                                                   
240. Id. at 1120.  
241. Id. at 1147–48. 
242. Id. at 1147. The Supreme Court later affirmed the Ninth Circuit but did not speak to finality 
in its opinion. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243. 
243. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1147.  
244. 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion vacated on reh’g en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). 
245. 465 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 839.  
249. Id. at 840 (emphasis added).  
250. Id. at 839 (quoting Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 309 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (Silberman, J., concurring)).  
251. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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bind the agency, triggering legal consequences.252 This repurposing of the 
impact on agencies test appeared to categorically preclude judicial review 
of a true policy statement.253 Indeed, a district court in the Ninth Circuit 
recently followed suit, holding that a purported policy statement was final 
agency action precisely because it was not a true policy statement.254 
In Oregon Natural Desert,255 decided a few months after Veneman, the 
Ninth Circuit suggested a more flexible approach, one that might allow 
review of a policy statement. The court held as final agency action the 
United States Forest Service’s issuance of annual operating instructions 
“to permittees who graze livestock on national forest land.” 256 The court 
did not classify the agency action as either an interpretive rule or a policy 
statement.257 Significantly, the court did not ask whether the permit 
instructions had a binding effect on the agency itself when articulating its 
test for finality.258 Instead, the court highlighted the flexible use of the 
word “or” in the second prong of the Bennett test.259 The court surmised 
that this disjunctive test allowed review of agency actions that “impose an 
obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation 
of the administrative process.”260 This approach allows review of agency 
action that “has a ‘direct and immediate . . . effect on the day-to-day 
business’” of affected parties.261 In other words, a guidance document’s 
“practical effects and substantial impact on regulated parties can be 
enough to meet Bennett’s second prong.”262 This recharacterization of the 
test arguably opened the door for judicial review of some 
policy  statements. 
In the 2019 case Gill v. United States Department of Justice,263 the 
Ninth Circuit firmly resolved the tension between Veneman and Oregon 
Natural Desert. Drawing on the holding in Oregon Natural Desert, the 
                                                   
252. Veneman, 469 F.3d at 840. 
253. Id.  
254. See W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1227, 1232 (D. Idaho 2018) 
(holding that a policy statement was not a legislative rule “for reasons already articulated” in the 
section explaining why it was not final). 
255. 465 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006). 
256. Id. at 979.  
257. Id.  
258. See generally id. 
259. See generally id. 
260. Id. at 987 (emphasis in original) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). 
261. Id. at 987 (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)).  
262. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2466. 
263. 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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Ninth Circuit explicitly held that a policy statement constituted final 
agency action.264 The court determined that the Functional Standard, a 
standardized system of information sharing among agencies regarding 
terrorism activities,265 was a policy statement.266 The court nevertheless 
held that it was final because it triggered “legal and practical effects.”267 
The court analyzed the legal and practical effects of the Functional 
Standard. First, the court determined that the Functional Standard had 
legal consequences under Oregon Natural Desert, although participation 
in the national information sharing program was within the agencies’ 
discretion.268 The court explained that once an agency decided to 
participate in the program, the administering agency could revoke its 
membership—and consequently remove the agency’s access to shared 
information—for failure to comply with the Functional Standard.269 
Second, the court determined that the Functional Standard had practical 
consequences.270 The court explained that when an agency joined the 
program, “there was the immediate understanding that its analysts would 
conform to the Functional Standard.”271 The case itself did not indicate 
whether practical effects alone could render an agency action final.272 
Significantly, however, it demonstrated that a non-binding policy 
statement could trigger “legal consequences” as required under the 
Bennett test and that practical effects played a role in the analysis 
as  well.273 
IV. THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT APPROACH TO FINALITY 
The Supreme Court should adopt the substantial impact test in place of 
                                                   
264. Id. at 1185.  
265. President George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
(Dec. 16, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/news/2005/12/wh121605-memo.html [https://perma.cc/J5P2-B8SK].  
266. Gill, 913 F.3d at 1186–87. 
267. Id. at 1184–85 (citing Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th 
Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). 
268. Id. at 1185. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id.  
272. See SurvJustice Inc. v. DeVos, No. 18-CV-00535-JSC, 2019 BL 112847, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 29, 2019) (“The Court is not convinced that the Gill court’s holding regarding finality based on 
the practical effects of the Functional Standard can carry that weight. The holding instead appears 
intertwined with the court’s holding regarding the legal consequences because both rely on the 
eGuardian User Agreement.”).  
273. Id. at *3 (“[T]he Gill court determined that the Functional Standard produced legal 
consequences despite its nonbinding nature.”) (citing Gill, 913 F.3d at 1184-85). 
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Bennett’s second prong. First, judicial review allows courts to perform an 
essential check on agency action. Second, Supreme Court precedent 
supports a substantial impact approach to finality. Rather than focus 
merely on a rule’s effect on the agency itself—as many lower court 
decisions have done—the Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach seems to 
emphasize the effect that agency action has on parties outside of the 
agency. Third, the substantial impact test provides a model for reviewing 
a small subset of policy statements, like the DACA rescission, that have a 
substantial impact on private individuals but do not bind the discretion of 
agency officials. 
A. The Importance of Judicial Review for Policy Statements 
When enacting the APA, Congress warned “that the practice of creating 
administrative agencies . . . threatens to develop a ‘fourth branch’ of the 
Government for which there is no sanction in the Constitution.”274 
Congress likely had this concern in mind when it drafted section 553 of 
the APA, providing for notice-and-comment procedures.275 These 
procedures were intended to make agencies more accountable to the 
public.276 However, when agencies issue policy statements, they 
necessarily bypass these procedures277 and the accountability that stems 
from them. Generally, the more extensive procedures an agency employs 
the more judicial deference its conclusions receive.278 Denying judicial 
review of policy statements has the inverse result: agency action requiring 
virtually no procedures results in no judicial review at all and allows 
agencies complete deference.279 By issuing policy statements, agencies 
can dodge both notice-and-comment procedures and judicial review, 
possibly avoiding accountability altogether.280 
With increased presidential control over agencies,281 opponents may 
                                                   
274. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 at 242 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 1195, 1195. 
275. Tracy C. Hauser, The Administrative Procedure Act, Procedural Rule Exception to the Notice 
and Comment Requirement - A Survey of Cases, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 519, 521 (1991). 
276. Id.  
277. See Hylas, supra note 24, at 1648–49.  
278. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (recognizing that 
extensive procedures warrant deference and denying Chevron deference because agency’s procedures 
were “far removed . . . from [the] notice-and-comment process”). 
279. McKee, supra note 44, at 401. 
280. Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635–36 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing William 
Funk, Final Agency Action After Hawkes, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 285, 304 (2017)).  
281. See Hylas, supra note 24, at 1651; see generally Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential 
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argue that the public holds agencies accountable through the political 
process.282 However, this explanation is unsatisfactory for two reasons. 
First, the mere availability of judicial review lends legitimacy to federal 
agencies.283 Judicial review “suggests that the will of the majority is 
always subject to the limitations of the Constitution and that government 
therefore operates by consent inasmuch as all citizens have agreed to 
government action in accordance with the Constitution.”284 Second, 
providing judicial review of an agency’s reasoning forces the agency to 
make reasoned decisions and, importantly, to own up to its decisions, two 
actions which are necessary for an informed public to hold agencies 
accountable.285 This sentiment is particularly salient when the agency is 
implying that its administering statute prevents it from acting, thereby 
pushing the burden onto Congress.286 
It is true that not all parties affected by non-final agency action are 
barred from the courthouse. After all, litigants may wait for the agency to 
rely on the policy statement in an enforcement proceeding,287 or they may 
bring constitutional claims.288 But “regulatory beneficiaries . . . are 
generally not parties to enforcement actions, and, therefore, may only be 
able to challenge nonlegislative rules via judicial review.”289 The threat of 
                                                   
Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2016) (detailing the evolution of presidential control over agencies 
from the Reagan Administration to the Obama Administration); id. at 685 (“This Article picks up 
where Kagan left off nearly fifteen years ago, demonstrating that presidential control has deepened 
during the [Bush and Obama] presidencies.”).  
282. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 59 (1983) (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a 
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its 
programs and regulations.”). The view that agencies will be responsive to the will of the public also 
contradicts the view that agencies should “apply their expertise dispassionately,” another argument 
for limited review of agency action. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth 
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 387, 434 n.233 (1987). 
283. Shapiro, supra note 282, at 394–95.  
284. Id. at 395.  
285. See Regents, 908 F.3d 476, 498 (explaining that when an agency attempts to hide beneath its 
discretion while really making a legal argument, it is the job of the courts to determine if the legal 
argument is sound). 
286. See id.  
287. Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin. 738 F.3d 387, 390 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (Non-final agency action “is not subject to judicial review unless it is relied upon or applied 
to support an agency action in a particular case”). 
288. Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (2012)) (“Claims not grounded in the APA, like the constitutional claims in Presbyterian 
Church and VCS I, ‘do[ ] not depend on the cause of action found in the first sentence of § 702’ and 
thus § 704’s limitation does not apply to them.”).  
289. Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Nina A. 
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an enforcement proceeding may be enough to coerce some parties into 
obeying, particularly where an enforcement proceeding would be 
especially costly.290 Additionally, not all those harmed by a policy 
statement can point to a viable constitutional claim. 
“At bottom, finality is about agency accountability for the decisions it 
makes and the consequences it unleashes.”291 The decision to grant or 
deny review under finality determines for example “whether those who 
are told to close up shop and discharge their employees are entitled first 
to a day in court.”292 If courts continue to interpret policy statements as 
non-final, they may preclude themselves from carrying out this essential 
function on an entire category of influential agency action. 
B. Supreme Court Precedent Supports a Substantial Impact Approach 
to Finality 
Supreme Court precedent supports shifting away from the more 
categorical approach and instead adopting a substantial impact approach 
toward finality. First, the lower courts’ approach of supplanting Bennett’s 
second prong with the impact on agencies test defies binding Supreme Court 
precedent. Second, cases employing the Supreme Court’s pragmatic 
approach, as recently emphasized in Hawkes, suggest that the Court also 
considers a rule’s impact outside of the agency in its finality analysis. A 
substantial impact approach, which considers the action’s practical impact 
outside of the agency, would thus be consistent with this precedent. 
First, with the exception of the Gill Court, it appears that the lower courts 
are categorically classifying policy statements as non-final.293 However, this 
categorical approach contradicts the Supreme Court’s precedent. The 
decision in Park Hospitality Association v. DOI294—holding that what it 
deemed to be a “general statement of policy” was final—suggests that policy 
statements are at least not categorically non-final.295 Indeed, no trace of the 
categorical approach appears in either Bennett or Hawkes: neither court 
                                                   
Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 
420–24 (2007)). 
290. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967). 
291. Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Millett, J., dissenting), 
petition for cert. filed. 
292. Id. at 1285. 
293. See supra Part III. 
294. 538 U.S. 803 (2003). 
295. Id. at 809 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012) (quotations omitted)). 
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“asked whether the action at issue had the force and effect of law”296; nor did 
they ask whether the agency action was binding on the agency itself.297 
Supplanting Bennett’s second prong with the impact on agencies test may 
have the reverse effect intended by the Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach. 
In Abbott Laboratories, the Court explained that the challenged regulation 
put private parties “in a dilemma” because they had to comply or risk an 
enforcement proceeding.298 The Norton Court in the D.C. Circuit applied the 
equivalent of the impact on agencies test to determine that agency action was 
not final.299 The court explained that “there ha[d] been no enforcement 
actions that indicate[d] whether the FWS consider[ed] itself bound by survey 
results.”300 The holding effectively requires courts to wait for the agency to 
bring enforcement proceedings to determine if the policy statement is actually 
binding and therefore final.301 Requiring that a purported policy statement 
bind the agency before labeling it final seems to undermine the holding in 
Abbott Laboratories and other Supreme Court cases that take a pragmatic 
approach to finality. After all, these cases emphasized the fact that agency 
action may be final before enforcement proceedings are brought.302 
Second, precedent supports an approach that looks to the practical effect 
of a rule outside of the agency. The Court in Frozen Food held as final an 
order that “had no authority except to give notice of how the Commission 
interpreted . . .” the law because of practical consequences on parties outside 
of the agency.303 Because the order warned private parties that they risked 
separate criminal penalties, it was final and immediately reviewable.304 
Furthermore, in Abbott Laboratories, the Court emphasized the challenged 
regulation’s “direct effect on the day-to-day business” of regulated parties.305 
And in 2016, Hawkes reemphasized this pragmatic approach.306 
Parties affected by policy statements may also face the dilemma 
highlighted in Abbott Laboratories307 Individuals may reasonably fear an 
                                                   
296. Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
297. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. 
Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). 
298. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967). 
299. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
300. Id.  
301. See id. 
302. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152. 
303. Id. (citing Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956)). 
304. Id. 
305. Id.  
306. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016). 
307. See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.  
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enforcement proceeding even if the agency has not officially bound itself 
and committed to enforcing its policy statement. The DACA rescission 
exemplifies this. Indeed, DHS may continue to grant deferred action on a 
case-by-case basis and to classify DACA recipients as low priority for 
deportation.308 However, the agency itself warned DACA recipients to “be 
prepared to no longer remain here.”309 
Opponents may argue that the substantial impact test has no place in 
the jurisprudence because Vermont Yankee’s310 holding is widely viewed 
as invalidating the substantial impact test as applied to procedural 
sufficiency. However, Vermont Yankee’s holding cannot fairly be read to 
bar the use of the substantial impact test in all areas. Courts have generally 
assumed that the holding of Vermont Yankee invalidated the substantial 
impact test as it was applied to notice-and-comment procedures only.311 
Vermont Yankee emphasized the importance of giving discretion to 
agencies “in determining when extra procedural devices should be 
employed.”312 It does not follow, then, that courts should give discretion 
to agencies in determining whether their action should be reviewable. 
Indeed, considering the importance of judicial review for agency 
accountability, such a result would be absurd. 
Furthermore, the substantial impact test combined with the first prong of 
Bennett satisfies the purpose of finality as defined by the Supreme Court. 
Finality seeks to control timing,313 yet Bennett’s first prong satisfies much of 
the timing element.314 Courts must wait for action that “marks the 
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” before they can 
review it.315 Requiring the agency action to have a substantial impact on 
parties outside the agency also serves “to protect agencies from undue judicial 
interference with their lawful discretion . . . .”316 If agency action marks the 
                                                   
308. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 513 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 1156 (June 28, 2019) (“[T]he rescission memorandum . . . leaves 
in place the background principle that deferred action is available on a case-by-case basis.” (citing 
Duke Memo, supra note 18)).  
309. Rebecca Shabad, How the Decision to End DACA Affects “Dreamers”, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 
2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-the-decision-to-end-daca-affects-dreamers/ 
[https://perma.cc/7LUU-K2YZ]. 
310. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
311. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152. 
312. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 546. 
313. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 136, at 1453. 
314. See also McKee, supra note 44, at 406–07 (arguing that Bennett’s first prong alone would 
satisfy Congress’s purpose behind the finality requirement).  
315. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). 
316. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 56 (2004). 
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consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, that party has 
necessarily exhausted its administrative remedies. If at that point, the action 
has a substantial impact on a private party who has no other remedies 
available, judicial interference cannot fairly be said to be  “undue.” 
C. The DACA Rescission Would Have a Substantial Impact 
The DACA rescission typifies a policy statement that does not bind the 
agency yet still has a substantial impact outside of the agency. According 
to the Ninth Circuit, the DACA rescission survives the impact on agencies 
test and is a policy statement under the modern application of the law; 317 
however, the Ninth Circuit never addressed finality, likely because the 
government never raised the issue.318 After DACA’s rescission, litigants 
filed suit in various jurisdictions across the country.319 In response to each 
of these lawsuits, the DHS failed to directly dispute that the policy 
rescinding DACA was final agency action under APA section 704.320 
                                                   
317. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018). 
318. See infra notes 320–322. 
319. Regents, 908 F.3d at 514; Batalla Vidal v. Duke (No. 17-cv-5228-NGG-JO) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 
27, 2017); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 237 (D.D.C. 2018), adhered to on denial of 
reconsideration, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018). 
320. Defendants’ Notice of Motion And Motion to Dismiss All N.D. Cal. DACA Cases; 
Memorandum In Support, Regents, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 3:17-cv-05211-WHA) (No. 
3:17-cv-05235-WHA) (No. 3:17-cv-05329-WHA) (No. 3:17-cv-05380-WHA) (No. 3:17-cv-05813-
WHA) (N.D. CA 2017); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 
(D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-1907); Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, For Summary 
Judgment, Trustees of Princeton v. U.S., 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-cv-2325); 
Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment, Casa De Md. v. 
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 17-cv-2942); Defendants’ 
Motion To Dismiss, Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-cv-41196) 
(No. 16-cv-4756) (No. 17-cv-5228); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Provisional Relief at 16, n.7, Nos. 17-CV-
05211-WHA, 17-CV-05235-WHA, 17-CV-05329-WHA, 17-CV-05380-WHA, 17-CV-05813-WHA 
(Nov. 2017) (“In the motion to dismiss filed in Batalla Vidal v. Duke, No. 16-cv-41196 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 27, 2017), ECF No. 95-1, defendants did not challenge finality or ripeness. If defendants take a 
contrary position in this case, plaintiffs will respond either in their opposition to defendants’ motion 
to dismiss or in their reply supporting the instant motion.”). The government’s motions did raise 
several issues that were peripheral to finality. The government argued that the Plaintiffs’ claim that 
DHS violated 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) failed because its requirement to publish impact on small 
businesses only applies to rules that have gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Motion 
to Dismiss at 39, Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-cv-4756-NGG-
Jo) (No. 17-cv-5228-NGG-JO) (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 42 (D.C. Cir. 
2005)), (“The RFA’s requirement that an agency publish analyses of a rule’s impact on small 
businesses applies only ‘when an agency promulgates a final rule under section 553 of . . . title [5], 
after being required by that section or any other law to publish a general notice of proposed 
rulemaking.’”). The government also argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012) only allows review of 
final removal decisions and that this was not a final removal decision. See Motion to Dismiss at 22, 
Casa De Md., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by 
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Under the D.C. Circuit’s view in Trudeau, discussed above,321 the issue may 
have been waived. Although the Supreme Court may never rule on finality 
here, this case presents an example of a policy statement that would be final 
under the proposed substantial impact approach. 
Under the older substantial impact test, the rescission of DACA likely 
would have been deemed a legislative rule, not a policy statement. Similarly, 
under a substantial impact approach to finality, the DACA rescission would 
be final agency action. Lewis-Mota322—discussed in Part I of this Comment 
as an example of the substantial impact test—provides a useful model for 
analyzing the substantial impact of the DACA  rescission. 
The DACA rescission mirrors the fact pattern in Lewis-Mota, a case that 
applied the substantial impact test to hold that the Secretary of Labor’s 
revocation of a policy was actually a legislative rule.323 In Lewis-Mota, the 
Secretary rescinded a program that gave priority to applicants seeking 
permanent residence who had specified occupations.324 Similarly, the case at 
hand involves a rescission of DACA, a program that gave deferred action 
priority to undocumented individuals meeting certain  criteria.325 
Although the agency in Lewis-Mota, like DHS,326 could still review the 
applications of those individuals on a case-by-case basis, the court held that 
both the original program and the rescission of that program would have a 
substantial impact on both the undocumented individuals seeking permanent 
residence and employers seeking to hire those individuals.327 Permanent 
residents would face a more burdensome application process, and employers 
                                                   
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the [Secretary of Homeland Security] 
to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this 
chapter.”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. See Regents, 908 
F.3d at 503 (“The Supreme Court has explicitly held that this section ‘applies only to three discrete 
actions that the [Secretary] may take: her ‘decision or action’ to 
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)) (emphasis in original)). The government also 
argued that there was no change to DHS’s privacy policy, so there was no APA finality and the claims 
regarding the privacy policy were not final agency action. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 34, 
Trustees of Princeton, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (No. 17-cv-2325); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 37, 
Casa De Md. 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 38–39 (No. 17-cv-2942). 
321. See supra citation to section II.A. 
322. Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972). 
323. Id. at 482. 
324. Id. at 480.  
325. Napolitano Memo, supra note 7.  
326. Duke Memo, supra note 18; Carrie Johnson, Trump Rescinds DACA, Calls on Congress to 
Replace It, NPR (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/06/548819221/trump-administration-
rescinds-daca-calls-on-congress-to-replace-it [https://perma.cc/9LHP-4866].  
327. Lewis-Mota, 469 F.2d at 482. 
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would struggle to fill job vacancies.328 
Revoking DACA would have an even greater impact on both DACA 
recipients and employers. DACA recipients would be subject to 
deportation, lose their Employment Authorization Documents and other 
government benefits, and be unable to reenter the United States if they had 
not already obtained Advance Parole.329 Employers would not be able to 
retain DACA recipients once their Employment Authorization Documents 
expired and would be forced to replace them.330 Moreover, the effect on the 
economy is estimated to be as much as $280 billion in lost growth331 and 
700,000 lost jobs.332 
Because DHS still retains its discretion to grant deferred action on a case-
by-case basis, the rescission of DACA does not bind the agency and thus is 
not a substantive rule. Under the modern impact on agency test, this means 
that the rescission of DACA did not need to undergo notice-and-comment 
procedures. If courts adopted a substantial impact approach to Bennett’s 
second prong, the rescission of DACA would be final agency action and thus 
reviewable whether or not the issue had been  waived. 
CONCLUSION 
DHS’s rescission of DACA occupies a curious space in administrative 
law. It has the potential to substantially impact hundreds of thousands of 
undocumented individuals, yet in virtually all lower courts it is not reviewable 
because it is a policy statement. Some courts applying a flexible approach are 
willing to review interpretive rules, and recently, in Gill, the Ninth Circuit 
was willing to review a policy statement. This Comment argues that some 
policy statements, such as the rescission of DACA, should also be reviewable 
in courts. By applying the substantial impact test as Bennett’s second prong, 
courts could hold as final any agency action that (1) marks the end of the 
agency’s decisionmaking process and (2) has a substantial impact outside of 
the agency. Applying the substantial impact test adheres to the Supreme 
Court’s more recent precedent in cases like Hawkes, which emphasize a 
pragmatic approach. Moreover, it allows courts to hold agencies accountable 
when their actions have a substantial impact on private individuals. 
                                                   
328. Id.  
329. Rebecca Shabad, How the Decision to End DACA Affects “Dreamers”, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-the-decision-to-end-daca-affects-dreamers [https://perma.cc/7LUU-K2YZ].  
330. Id.  
331. Alana Abramson, Here’s How Much Rescinding DACA Could Cost the U.S. Economy, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/05/daca-donald-trump-economic-impact/ 
[https://perma.cc/934F-BESM]. 
332. Id.  
